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The Law Commission has published its final report on aggravated, exemplary and 
restitutionary damages, the most important recommendation of which is an expansion 
of the availability of exemplary damages.
1
 The Report was preceded by two 
consultation papers, and this is no doubt indicative of the range of views held on the 
subject and the problems of reconciling them. Aggravated and exemplary damages 
have been a perennial source of controversy, since before the famous case of Rookes v 
Barnard.
2
 They raise not only problems of terminology, but also more fundamental 
problems concerning the relation between civil and criminal procedure, and the 
rationale for punishment and civil remedies. One source of difficulty may be that the 
issues tend to span different areas of practical expertise and research. Another may be 
that theoretical issues are lost in what appear to be matters of practice and procedure. 
Restitutionary damages are no less controversial. Under this name they are not a 
traditional remedy; the expression has emerged from the academic development of the 
law of restitution. Despite the academic attention they have received, it remains 
                                                 
1 Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages, Law Com no 247, 16 December 1997. 
2 [1964] AC 1129. 
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controversial to what extent they are found in the common law, how they are to be 
justified, and when they should be available. 
 
Aggravated damages 
The Report is about the appropriate legal response to a wrong to the plaintiff. A 
“wrong” means a breach of duty owed to the plaintiff, however arising; “legal 
response” is intended as a general term to include (amongst other things) 
compensation, an injunction or punishment.
3
 The usual response in civil proceedings 
is a remedy, in the sense that the response seeks to remedy or rectify the wrong 
through an injunction to secure the fulfilment of the duty, or compensation to simulate 
the performance of the duty by giving the plaintiff the pecuniary value of the 
performance of the duty owed to him.
4
 Punishment is a different form of response, 
which is not a remedy at all in this sense. It is an important feature of the Report that 
it upholds the distinction now recognised in the case law between aggravated 
damages, which are remedial, and exemplary damages, which are punitive.
5
 
Aggravated damages, the Report considers, are intended to compensate for a 
particular form of harm, namely mental distress, or at least a certain form of mental 
distress. It takes the view there is no need for a distinct law of aggravated damages 
concerned with one type of mental distress. The law of aggravated damages should in 
due course be assimilated with the rest of the law concerning damages for mental 
distress. 
                                                 
3 These expressions are not defined in these terms in the Report. 
4 See Daniel Friedmann, “The Performance Interest in Contract Damages” (1995) 111 LQR 628. 
5 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; Report, paras 2.2, 2.40-2.43 
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It is surely right to distinguish firmly between compensation and punishment. But the 
Report’s analysis of aggravated damages is a little hasty. Aggravated damages are 
traditionally awarded in cases where the mental distress in question is outrage or 
indignation resulting from the cynical, flagrant or insulting nature of the defendant’s 
wrong.
6
 In other words the “mental distress” in issue is really the emotional 
concomitant of a moral attitude of condemnation. This is why aggravated damages 
have traditionally been associated with exemplary damages, because in such cases 
punishment of the defendant may well also be called for (assuming that the outrage 
and indignation are justified). The only feasible way to assuage feelings of outrage or 
indignation is through punishment duly administered. Punishment is, after all, at least 
partly explained as the public expression of the indignation and outrage of the 
community as a whole, in sympathy with and on behalf of the victim.
7
 An attempt to 
compensate the victim by a money payment for such feelings without condemnation 
of the wrongdoer is misguided and is any case unlikely to be satisfactory to the 
victim. It would be better to abandon the idea of compensating for this form of 
“mental distress” and concentrate on ensuring that the means are always available for 
imposing punishment where it is appropriate, by exemplary damages if necessary.
8
 
This is not of course to deny the legitimacy or the importance of compensating for 
                                                 
6 Paras 2.1-2.3, 2.18.  
7 See below, at nn9-10. 
8 The Report casts doubt on the decision of the Court of Appeal in AB v South West Water Services 
[1993] QB 507 not to award aggravated damages for indignation: paras 2.32, 2.36. 
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other forms of mental distress in appropriate cases.
9
 Neither does it mean that 
punishment should be tailored to satisfy the demands of the victim. 
 
Exemplary damages 
Punishment in civil proceedings 
The Report accepts that exemplary damages are punitive, but there is surprisingly 
little discussion of what punishment is, or how it is to be distinguished from other 
legal responses, or how punishment is related to crime or to the fundamental division 
between civil and criminal law; and yet it is surely clear that these issues must be 
relevant to the law on exemplary or punitive damages. Punishment consists of a 
constraint or harm imposed by the authority of the state in consequence of a breach of 
a duty imposed by law. But, furthermore, what distinguishes punishment from a 
remedy like compensation or an injunction arising from a breach of duty (which also 
involves the imposition of a constraint or harm on the defendant) is the purpose and 
intended effect of the imposition. For punishment, it is (to put it in general terms) to 
uphold the community interest in compliance with the duty in question,
10
 whereas for 
a remedy it is the protection of the private interest of the particular plaintiff in the 
performance of the duty owed to him.
11
 
 
The purpose for which the response is made determines the circumstances in which it 
is justified and the procedure that should be required as a prerequisite. In the case of a 
                                                 
9 eg fear, frustration or anxiety. 
10 This definition is apt whether punishment is conceived of as being for the purpose of deterrence or 
retribution or vindication. 
11 Cf N Lacey, State Punishment (Routledge, 1988), 100.  
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claim for a remedy, the procedural and evidential rules should reflect the fact that the 
plaintiff and defendant are on a more or less equal footing, the plaintiff’s interest in a 
remedy (if his claim is right) competing with the defendant’s comparable interest in 
being free from liability for the remedy (if the plaintiff’s claim is unjustified). By 
contrast, in the case of punishment the proceedings are not a contest between two 
parties on an equal footing but a trial of the defendant in which his guilt and the 
community’s interest in punishment are at issue. The  injustice to the defendant of 
mistaken punishment greatly exceeds the injustice of a mistaken acquittal. Thus there 
is every reason to adopt a procedure and evidential rules weighted in the defendant’s 
favour which give him additional safeguards against an unjust outcome.
12
 In addition 
the imposition of punishment is generally taken (at least for less minor cases) to 
require that the defendant have committed the breach of duty intentionally (in the 
sense this is given under the doctrine of mens rea).  
 
It follows from this approach that what distinguishes criminal and civil law is not the 
nature of the duty breached but the nature of the response to the breach (and the 
requirement that the breach be intentional in the case of a punitive response). Thus in 
principle one should not speak, say, of two duties not to assault, one in criminal law 
and one in civil law, but one duty not to assault, the breach of which gives rise to two 
different types of legal response, according to whether it is the victim who is seeking 
a remedy or the community seeking to punish. The duty itself is a prescription for 
action (or inaction) - it is defined in terms of its content, not the consequences of 
                                                 
12 See Peter Jaffey “Restitutionary Damages and Disgorgement” [1995] RLR 30, 39, and articles cited 
there. 
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breach. Traditionally punishment and remedies have been administered in different 
sets of proceedings, civil and criminal, because of the different procedural and 
evidential requirements associated with them, and because in one case the action is 
instigated by the victim for his own benefit and in the other case by the state in the 
public interest. It follows that “crime” cannot be distinguished from other wrongdoing 
in terms of a general definition of conduct. A crime is simply a wrong punishable 
through criminal proceedings. This definition does not of course define the various 
duties to which people are subject, and has accordingly seemed inadequate to some, 
but it distinguishes criminal from civil law.
13
 
 
The strict segregation of punishment and remedy into different proceedings creates a 
danger of an inadequate legal response. In principle, every breach of duty should 
attract a “full legal response”, which means a sufficient remedy (where the duty is 
owed to another person) in the form of an injunction if possible and otherwise 
compensation, and punishment if the breach was committed deliberately. However 
not every deliberate breach of duty is recognised as a crime, although it is fair to say 
that this is true in most cases. Where it is not, punishment may be unnecessary, even 
where the wrong is deliberate, if the measure of the liability for compensation exceeds 
what would be apt by way of punishment.
14
 The issue of punitive damages arises 
where the defendant has committed a deliberate breach of duty giving rise to civil 
proceedings that is not punishable through criminal proceedings and for which the 
                                                 
13 See JC Smith, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (Butterworths, 8th ed, 1996), 20-23. 
14 Although it may obviate the need for punishment, it is still best to say that the payment is 
compensation and not punishment, because its purpose and justification are as a remedy and not a 
punishment, as the nature of civil procedure shows. 
 7 
measure of compensation falls short of what would be apt as punishment. If there is a 
civil cause of action for which this is commonly the case, the obvious answer is to 
recognise the conduct in question as a crime, or if it already is recognised as a crime 
to make sure that criminal proceedings are taken. But there may be breaches of duty 
where it is appropriate instead to have punishment by way of punitive damages in 
civil proceedings. This might be the case where the victim is likely to have resources 
to take proceedings, and where the duty is not so important as to require the more 
severe forms of punishment available in criminal proceedings. This might be an 
efficient way of achieving the full legal response, since it saves public resources and 
avoids two sets of proceedings. 
 
This is only acceptable, however, if it is possible to install appropriate safeguards for 
the defendant in respect of the punishment. It may not be necessary for him to have 
the same degree of protection as he would have in the case of serious offences leading 
to imprisonment, but it is surely inconceivable that the defendant’s interest in not 
being wrongly punished could ever be thought so unimportant that the balance of 
probabilities would be appropriate as the standard of proof. There are other problems 
with punishment in civil proceedings. If the punishment is in the form of money paid 
to the plaintiff, the plaintiff will receive a supra-compensatory payment or windfall. 
Furthermore the wrong may have a number of victims, so that the difficulty arises of 
who is to receive the windfall payment and how it is to be allocated. And if the 
punishment is made through civil proceedings controlled by the plaintiff, it is open to 
the parties to compromise the proceedings, whereas criminal proceedings are as a rule 
 8 
not open to compromise.
15
 Since punishment is imposed in the public interest, 
compromise of proceedings with the victim, although it may be in the interests of the 
victim, may not always be in the public interest and may mean that the law is 
inadequately enforced. The same objection does not apply to negotiation and 
settlement or waiver over a remedy, whose purpose is only to protect the private 
interest of the plaintiff.
16
 Also there is the need to ensure co-ordination with criminal 
proceedings for the same wrong to avoid double punishment or double jeopardy. 
These difficulties suggest that punitive damages should be an exceptional response, or 
at least that they should not be the normal form of punishment for serious wrongs and 
possibly wrongs that cause harm to several parties. 
 
The Report’s approach to punitive damages 
The Report points out that the common law world seems to have divided into two 
approaches on punitive damages.
17
 The first approach, which underlies the current 
English law, is that punitive damages are never appropriate in civil proceedings. This 
was the view of the majority in the House of Lords in Rookes v Barnard. However, 
out of deference to existing case law, the House accepted that punitive damages 
should continue to be available in certain cases. This left the law in an awkward state; 
in particular the House seems to have adopted the extraordinary “cause of action rule” 
according to which the availability of punitive damages depends on whether punitive 
                                                 
15 See eg MP Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract (Butterworths,13th ed, 1996), 
381. 
16 Subject to the problem of unequal resources to litigate and bear risk, and possibly the public interest 
in having the law declared authoritatively. 
17 Para 4.5.  
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damages had been imposed in respect of such a cause of action before Rookes v 
Barnard was decided.
18
 The underlying view that punitive damages are never 
appropriate in civil proceedings reflects the recognition of the desirability of 
segregating punishment and remedies, for the reasons considered above, in particular 
the need for special safeguards that are available only in criminal proceedings, even at 
the expense of accepting that there will be an inadequate legal response in some 
circumstances. The second approach is that a deliberate breach of duty that comes 
before a court in civil proceedings should as a rule be punished by way of punitive 
damages. This approach seems to have prevailed in the other common law 
jurisdictions, including Australia, New Zealand and the United States.
19
 It reflects the 
desirability of the full legal response at the expense of a strict segregation of remedies 
and punishment. The problem with this approach is that it may fail to address the 
difficulties mentioned above that have led to segregation, including the need for 
additional safeguards in the case of punishment. 
 
The Report is broadly in favour of English law moving to the second approach, 
according to which punitive damages should be generally available in civil 
proceedings.
20
 However, there is some confusion over the reasons for this. The Report 
takes the view that civil punishment is a different thing from criminal punishment, 
either in nature, or possibly in degree, or maybe because it is concerned with what is 
                                                 
18 The rule is criticised in the Report at paras 5.2-5.3. 
19 The Report does not consider the position in the US where this approach seems to have been taken 
furthest: see for example John G. Fleming The American Tort Process (Clarendon, Oxford, 1998) 
214ff. 
20 Paras 5.29, 5.38. 
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in principle a different category of breach of duty. It concludes that the objection to 
punishment in civil proceedings on the ground that punishment is the prerogative of 
criminal proceedings is misconceived. But it is very difficult to understand what 
could be meant by the idea that civil punishment is different from criminal 
punishment. Is civil punishment not really punishment at all? Is there a type of 
punishment to which the arguments above that tend to support segregation, including 
the argument for weighting the procedure in the defendant’s favour, do not apply? 
Does the Report mean that there is really only one concept of punishment but that 
civil and criminal procedures apply it to different types of wrong? No satisfactory 
explanation is offered, although these points lie at the very heart of the Report. 
However, having asserted that punishment is acceptable in civil proceedings because 
it is a different thing from criminal punishment, the Report then goes on quite 
inconsistently (but correctly in the light of the analysis above) to insist that punitive 
damages should be imposed only where the defendant acted deliberately, and to 
consider carefully the precautions that are called for to ensure that there is no double 
punishment or double jeopardy if punitive damages are generally available in civil 
proceedings for conduct that is also a crime.
21
  
 
Thus the Report considers briefly the issue of a higher standard of proof.
22
 It seems to 
take the view that a higher standard of proof is required in relation to punishment, and 
considers that this requirement is satisfactorily met by the practice of weighting the 
                                                 
21 But the Report is surely wrong to say (para 5.113) that a civil court should have a residual discretion 
to punish where a criminal court has already pronounced on the matter. 
22 Paras 4.99-4.101. 
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normal civil standard of proof in the defendant’s favour in the case of serious 
allegations. But if the test is weighted in the defendant’s favour, there is nothing to be 
gained from pretending that it is still the “balance of probabilities”.23 It may be that 
for less severe forms of punishment connoting a lesser degree of culpability it would 
be apt to adopt an intermediate standard lying between the balance of probabilities 
and proof beyond reasonable doubt, for example the standard of “clear and 
convincing” evidence used for certain purposes in the United States.24 The Report 
also considers the objection that the plaintiff receives a windfall.
25
 It is undesirable 
that a windfall should be received through the operation of the law, but it is no doubt 
less objectionable than a failure to punish where punishment is due. There are 
particular difficulties where there are multiple victims of a wrong, and the Report’s 
“first past the post” proposal for giving all the punitive damages to the first successful 
plaintiff is likely to make the law look capricious. The problem of compromise is not 
considered in the Report at all, although punitive damages clearly raise the issue 
because civil proceedings can be settled. The Report assumes that such compromise 
over punitive damages is to be encouraged, but as mentioned above this is at least 
open to argument.
26
 
 
                                                 
23 Also, at least on the argument above, the issue is not strictly the gravity of the allegations but the 
nature of the response, although it may be fair to say that if the allegations are serious there is a stigma 
in the decision that might be tantamount to punishment. 
24 See Colin Tapper, Cross & Tapper on Evidence (Butterworths, 8th ed 1995), 171-172. 
25 Paras 5.14, 5.31ff. 
26 Para 5.22. 
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It is important that the legal system should be able to offer the full legal response as 
defined above, and it is also important that the procedure to which the parties are 
subject should be adapted to the response in question. The segregation of punishment 
and remedy through the division between criminal and civil proceedings is for most 
purposes the best way to achieve this. But there is room for other arrangements. A 
limited role for compensation orders in criminal trials is well established.
27
 Punitive 
damages in civil proceedings can play a part also but they suffer the disadvantages 
mentioned above. Maybe there is room for developing other arrangements, like co-
operative proceedings involving the Crown and a civil plaintiff, or powers of the 
Crown to take punitive action through the civil courts,
28
 in relation to matters that the 
civil courts are expert in, and subject to appropriate safeguards. But for the moment 
the Report may be right that punitive damages should be generally available, although 
in my view it gives insufficient weight to the need for appropriate safeguards for the 
defendant. 
 
Breach of contract 
Breach of contract needs special consideration. In the United States, where punitive 
damages are generally available for a deliberate or “bad faith” tort, there is 
nevertheless controversy over whether they should be available for a deliberate 
breach of contract.
29
 The Report concludes that punitive damages should not 
                                                 
27 Under the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 s.35. 
28 As in effect happens in EC and US antitrust law. 
29 See for example John A. Sebert Jr., “Punitive and nonpecuniary damages in actions based upon 
contract: towards achieving the objective of full compensation” 33 UCLA Law Rev 1565 (1986). 
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generally be available for a breach of contract.
30
 This is ostensibly anomalous. Does a 
breach of contract not consist of a breach of duty, and should not the full legal 
response, including punishment for a deliberate breach of duty, be applied 
accordingly? The Report advances a number of reasons for withholding punitive 
damages for breach of contract, none of them convincing. One is that in contract 
losses tend to be only pecuniary. This is no doubt generally true, but it can also be 
true of serious crimes. Even accepting that the breach of a duty protecting against 
pecuniary loss is generally of less importance, the implication is that punishment in 
respect of such a breach should be less severe, not that it should be possible to breach 
the duty with impunity. A second reason is that there is said to be a greater need for 
certainty in contract law than in other areas, and so less scope for punitive damages, 
the measure of which is arguably liable to be less predictable than compensatory 
damages. But it is difficult to see why there should be a greater need for certainty in 
contract law than in property law or other areas that may be relevant to commercial 
planning. Indeed, to the contrary, it is common for contracts to leave certain matters 
open.
31
 A third reason given is that a contract is a private arrangement, and 
contractual rights do not arise directly from the general law. This is true, but it is 
unclear what its relevance is. If it is accepted that parties have the capacity to create 
duties by private arrangement, why should they not be properly enforced by 
punishment in the same way as other duties?
32
 A fourth reason is the theory of 
                                                 
30 Paras 5.70-72. 
31 It would be closer to the truth to say that the absence of punitive damages is related to the absence of 
certainty in contract: this is consistent with the reliance theory explanation in the next paragraph. 
32 One possible reason not discussed is that, in accordance with the harm principle, it is wrong for the 
law to go further than protecting against harm and so should not punish a breach of duty unless the 
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efficient breach, which is controversial even amongst adherents of law and 
economics.
33
 
 
But there is a good reason why the non-performance of a contract should not 
generally attract punishment. This is that contract law does not generally create duties 
of performance. It is usually understood to create duties of performance because an 
agreement is understood as an exchange of promises, and a promise creates a duty. 
Instead an agreement should be understood as involving the acceptance of 
responsibility for the other party’s reliance on the assumption that the performance 
specified in the agreement will be carried out.
34
 Such an interpretation implies that a 
contracting party does not have a duty to perform except in the special case where the 
payment of damages cannot reasonably compensate the other party for his reliance 
(consistently with the rule on specific performance, which should be available where 
there is a duty to perform.) Thus punitive damages should be available for breach of 
contract when the defendant failed to perform knowing that the plaintiff would in 
consequence suffer uncompensable loss. This is consistent with the approach of Mosk 
J in the recent Californian case of Freeman & Mills v Belcher.
35
 He said that punitive 
damages should be available where "a party intentionally breaches a contractual 
                                                                                                                                            
duty is to avoid harm rather than to confer a benefit: see J Raz, “Promises in Morality and Law” (1982) 
95 Harv LR 916. 
33 For a critique of the doctrine of efficient breach, see Daniel Friedmann, “The Efficient Breach 
Fallacy” (1989) 18 Journal of Legal Studies 1.  
34 This approach is developed in Peter Jaffey, “A New Version of the Reliance Theory” [1998] NILQ 
(forthcoming).  
35 900 P.2d 669 (Cal 1995). 
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obligation with neither probable cause nor belief that the obligation does not exist and 
when the party intends or knows that the breach will result in severe consequential 
damages to the other party that are not readily subject to mitigation, and such harm in 
fact occurs".
36
 This is liable to be the case where the plaintiff has become dependent 
on the defendant by putting himself, through entering the contract, in a position in 
which, in order to avoid loss on the contract, he needs performance that can only be 
supplied by the defendant. In such circumstances the defendant's responsibility for the 
plaintiff's reliance interest generates a duty to perform and the deliberate breach of the 
duty justifies punitive damages. 
 
Vicarious liability 
Vicarious liability is ostensibly difficult to justify even in relation to compensation, 
because it seems to involve liability, ostensibly in respect of a wrong, but imposed on 
a party who did not commit it. The best justification seems to be that it is not liability 
for a wrong at all, but a form of strict liability for losses caused by a business 
designed to ensure that the business cannot profit without also bearing responsibility 
for the losses involved in the profit-making activity, whether incurred by the business 
itself or by outsiders through the activities of the business.
37
 The Report seems to take 
the view that this argument also justifies vicarious liability for punitive damages,
38
 
but this is clearly not the case, because punitive damages do not represent any loss 
caused by the business. 
                                                 
36 Italics in original. The majority of the court held that punitive damages were never justified for 
breach of contract. 
37 For an argument on these lines, see Jane Stapledon, Product Liability (Butterworths, 1994), 185ff. 
38 Para 5.87ff. 
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It is also argued in the Report that vicarious liability for punitive damages is justified 
because of its deterrent effect on employers,
39
 in the form of the measures they will be 
induced to take to ensure that their employees are properly selected and trained and 
that decisions are properly taken with due consideration of the interests of outsiders. 
No doubt such “vicarious punishment” can have this effect, although the effect on the 
conduct of the employer would be maximised if its imposition depended on the 
conduct of the employer, and then of course the punishment would not be vicarious at 
all. In any case, vicarious punishment is objectionable because of its unfairness, 
certainly in relation to more serious offences. The argument for vicarious punishment 
equally supports the general use of group punishment and the abandonment of mens 
rea. The real issue here is the general problem of corporate criminal responsibility - 
how to deal with dangerous practices and procedures in companies or other 
organisations for which it is difficult to determine individual culpability, or for which 
no single individual is responsible. 
 
Restitutionary damages 
By restitutionary damages, the Report means, consistently with common usage, a 
response consisting of a pecuniary liability measured by the defendant’s gain. 
Sometimes restitutionary damages are regarded as “quasi-punitive”. On this approach 
it is the public interest that justifies stripping the defendant of his profit according to 
the principle that a wrongdoer should not be permitted to profit from his wrong, 
whether this principle is understood  as designed to remove the incentive to profit, or 
                                                 
39 Para 5.92. 
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to deny the wrongdoer a benefit that it would be intrinsically wrong for him to keep. 
Restitutionary damages on this understanding might be more aptly described as 
disgorgement.
40
 Disgorgement is the civil law equivalent of confiscation, just as 
punitive damages are the equivalent of a fine. Disgorgement (and confiscation) might 
appear to be unnecessary if punishment were always available, on the basis that due 
punishment would always negate the wrongdoer’s benefit. But it may be that it is 
right to remove the benefit of a wrong even in circumstances in which it would not be 
appropriate to punish, maybe where the wrong was inadvertent. In some cases, 
restitutionary damages have apparently been understood as disgorgement. For 
example, in the recent case of Halifax v Thomas,
41
 the Court of Appeal refused a 
claim for restitutionary damages for fraudulent misrepresentation. The tenor of the 
judgment makes clear that the judges viewed the claim as quasi-punitive 
disgorgement; they thought it gave the plaintiff a windfall and served the same 
purpose as a confiscation order. The Court’s hostility to the claim seems to have been 
due to its understanding that, like punishment, disgorgement is incongruous in civil 
proceedings. 
 
There is a distinct type of claim for restitutionary damages. In this type of case the 
defendant has benefited from his unauthorised use of the plaintiff’s property, as for 
example where the defendant trespassed on the plaintiff’s land or infringed his patent. 
The defendant is liable to pay what the court assesses as a fair licence fee for his use, 
                                                 
40 This usage is advocated in Lionel D. Smith, “The Province of the Law of Restitution” (1992) 71 Can 
Bar Rev 672, 694.  
41 [1996] 2 WLR 63. 
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which is generally taken to be a measure of the benefit he has received through the 
use of the property, although it would be better to say that it is a measure of 
reasonable payment for the benefit.
42
 In these cases there is no suggestion that the 
plaintiff is receiving a windfall, or that the rationale for the defendant’s liability is 
“quasi-punitive” in the sense above; it may not even be appropriate to say the 
defendant has committed a wrong. The claim is apparently based on the plaintiff’s 
inherent entitlement to payment for the use of his property, not on the defendant’s 
culpability. In other words the response is in the nature of a remedy rather than a 
punishment or quasi-punishment. It might be described as a claim for payment for 
unauthorised use or appropriation. The judges have not felt the discomfort in allowing 
such a claim that has affected them in the case of disgorgement or punitive damages.
43
 
 
It is crucial to distinguish between the two types of restitutionary damages, 
particularly in the present context. Disgorgement, like punitive damages, is a response 
imposed in the public interest rather than as a remedy for the plaintiff, and, as with 
punitive damages, it is important that it should be subject to special safeguards and to 
the need to ensure co-ordination with punishment and confiscation in criminal 
proceedings. On the other hand a claim for unauthorised use or appropriation (if it is 
justified at all) is properly a civil claim for a remedy, not raising any special 
difficulties of this sort. The distinction is also relevant to the issue of election - 
whether a plaintiff should have to choose between a claim for compensation and a 
                                                 
42 Strand Electric Engineering v Brisford Entertainments [1952] 2 QB 246, Ministry of Defence v 
Ashman [1993] 2 EGLR 102. 
43 Although the underlying justification of the claim is unclear. 
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claim for restitutionary damages, or whether they can be combined. If, for example, 
the defendant plaintiff suffered £1,000-worth of damage and the defendant made a 
£2,000 profit, should the plaintiff be able to claim both £1,000 compensation and 
£2,000 restitutionary damages, making a total of £3,000, or should he have to chose 
one or other, so that he is limited to £2,000? The Report concludes that the plaintiff 
must choose between the claims, although it acknowledges views to the contrary.
44
 In 
fact the answer depends on whether the claim in question is a disgorgement claim or a 
use or appropriation claim. The measure of disgorgement is the excess of the 
defendant’s profit over his liability in compensation, because this is what is necessary 
to ensure that he does not profit through his wrong. Thus the plaintiff should take 
whichever is larger, the defendant’s profit or the plaintiff’s loss (but there is no reason 
to require him to choose between them before all the facts come out in the trial, so 
long as he pleads both). On the other hand, a compensation claim and a use or 
appropriation claim are clearly independent and cumulative. If the £2,000 represents 
an appropriate imputed licence fee under a use or appropriation claim, there is no 
reason why the plaintiff should not be entitled to £3,000, the sum of the two claims.
45
 
 
It is unfortunate in my view that the Report makes no distinction between the 
disgorgement claim and the use or appropriation claim, although maybe unsurprising 
                                                 
44 Para 3.68.  
45 Also an imputed licence fee, unlike the measure of disgorgement, would normally fall short of the 
benefit received. 
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given that the distinction finds no place in the leading books on restitution.
46
 It is 
generally said both that the purpose of restitutionary damages is to prevent a 
defendant from profiting from his wrong, and also that “restitution for wrongs”, to 
which restitutionary damages are the response, is properly subsumed (with restitution 
for unjust enrichment by subtraction) under the single formula of “unjust enrichment 
at the expense of the plaintiff”, which is understood to generate a normal civil claim 
in respect of an interest of the plaintiff. Thus the Report does not consider in 
connection with restitutionary damages any of the procedural difficulties that it 
accepts are relevant to punitive damages. But, where restitutionary damages are to be 
equated with disgorgement as understood above, these issues do need to be 
considered, as Halifax v Thomas showed. 
 
Conclusion 
The Report distinguishes firmly between exemplary damages as a form of punishment 
and aggravated damages as a form of compensation. It is open to doubt, however, 
whether aggravated damages can be adequately dealt with by assimilating them to the 
law on compensation for mental distress, as the Report suggests. The most important 
recommendation is for the expansion of the availability of exemplary or punitive 
damages. The recommendation is defensible, but the Report’s analysis is 
unconvincing, and the issue needs to be considered as part of a wider assessment of 
the relation between civil and criminal law and the function of the division between 
                                                 
46 It was pointed out in Peter Jaffey, above n11. See also Daniel Friedmann, “Restitution of Benefits 
Obtained through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong” 80 Colum LR 504 
(1980). 
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the two. The Report’s approach to restitutionary damages is flawed by its failure to 
distinguish between the quasi-punitive liability for disgorgement and the liability for 
reasonable payment for the unauthorised use of property. Given the longstanding 
controversy surrounding the area, the Report’s recommendations are unlikely to 
attract universal approval; nevertheless, whether or not the Report leads to legislation, 
the Law Commission has certainly made a valuable contribution to the much-needed 
clarification and development of an important area of law. 
